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PORTRAIT OF THE EU AS A RATIONAL AGENT: 
COLLECTIVE REASON AND DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 
Vesco Paskalev*
Summary: In the present article I take a critical view of the well-known 
discursive dilemma which captures the difference between govern-
ance by collective reasoning and governance responsive to majoritar-
ian will. I identify a problem with the solution preferred by the re-
publican theory which I call the rationality gap  and suggest that in 
principle deliberation in the public sphere may bring the two ends to-
gether, thus avoiding the gap. Then I look at the European Union (EU) 
through the prism of civic republicanism and analyse it as an example 
of a system which collectivises reason. From such a perspective, the 
notorious democratic deficit is explainable as a contradiction between 
collective reason and popular will. In principle, pan-European deliber-
ation could close the gap there, too. However, it is obstructed by com-
petition from spontaneous deliberation in the existing national public 
spheres. The latter are more robust and for that reason the rationality 
gaps arising there are closed faster so that national public opinions 
polarise and defend ‘national’ interest against further deliberative 
challenges at the upper level. I argue that the notion of competition is 
useful to explain why, despite the development of common democratic 
institutions at the EU level and despite the emergence of a weak pan-
European public, the deficit is bound to persist.  
1. Collectivising reason 
1.1 The discursive dilemma
In 1986 Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager1 identified a para-
dox in collective decision-making which has haunted political and legal 
theory ever since. Philip Pettit, followed by a constellation of authors, 
have generalised the original paradox to make it a powerful lens for un-
derstanding political authority and many of the problems it faces.2 The 
*  Vesco Paskalev is a lecturer in EU Law at the University of Hull. A very early draft of this 
article was published as EUI Working Paper 19/2012. I would like to thank George Vasilev 
for his very helpful comments. 
1 Lewis A Kornhauser and Lawrence G Sager, ‘Unpacking the Court’ (1986) 96 Yale Law 
Journal 82.
2 His core argument first appeared in Philip Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy and the Dis-
cursive Dilemma’ (2001) 35 Philosophical Issues (Supplement of Noûs) 268. For a survey of 
the later developments, see Christian List and Clemens Puppe, ‘Judgement Aggregation’ in 
Paul Anand and others (eds), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice (OUP 2009).
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dilemma is the following: whenever a reasoned decision has to be taken 
by a collective decision-maker (either by a small board or a large popu-
lation) there are two possible routes. First, its members can assess the 
factual premises relevant for the decision independently, reach their own 
conclusions and then, on the basis of these individual conclusions, de-
termine the common decision on the issue by majority voting. Alterna-
tively, they can decide on the premises together, eg vote on each of the 
relevant premises,3 and then, on the basis of the common assessment of 
the premises, embrace the outcome which follows from these premises. 
The two procedural modes will often yield mutually contradicting out-
comes: ‘socially aggregating the conclusion-judgement gives us a differ-
ent result from socially aggregating the premise-judgement’.4 
This can be illustrated by the following example. Let us suppose that 
an authority headed by a board of three decision-makers is considering a 
certain policy to mitigate climate change. Suppose that it is undisputed 
among them that there are three relevant premises the cumulative avail-
ability of which warrants the adoption of the policy.5 These are: P1 – cli-
mate change is a real threat to society, P2 –the proposed policy will actu-
ally prevent or at least mitigate climate change, and P3 – the cost of the 
policy is economically bearable. However the members’ beliefs on each of 
the premises differ as per Matrix 1:
Members
P1: Climate 
threat real?
P2: Change 
preventable?
P3: Cost 
feasible?
Individual 
conclusions: 
A No No Yes No
B Yes Yes Yes Yes
C Yes Yes No No
Collective 
beliefs: Yes Yes Yes ?
Apparently, there is a majority believing that each of the premises 
obtains. Therefore, if the panel decides by voting on each of the premises, 
the decisions on all three will be such that warrant the adoption of the 
policy. However, if the panel does not decompose the issue to the sepa-
rate premises, but each of the members makes up his or her own mind 
3 In most of the examples, this determination is done by simple majority voting, but the re-
sult holds for any other judgment aggregation function such as unanimity, supermajority, 
etc. See Christian List and Philip Pettit, ‘Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility 
Result’ (2002) 18 Economics and Philosophy 89. 
4 Pettit (n 2) 273. 
5 To keep things simple throughout the paper, I shall take the premises and the whole log-
ical framework to be undisputed. Certainly, in actual decision-making for different groups, 
different considerations may be relevant.
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whether to adopt or reject the measure itself, there is a majority against 
the policy. Thus, the outcome in the bottom-right cell will differ, depend-
ing on whether the decision is taken in premise-wise mode (PWM) or in 
conclusion-wise mode (CWM). It is worth noting that sometimes all mem-
bers of the panel may individually oppose the policy; yet, it is collectively 
rational to have it adopted (in the example above, this would be the case if 
A judges P2 to be true but B judges it to be false). Whenever this is so, the 
panel will hold the two opposite views at the same time – a collective opin-
ion in favour of the policy and personal views of all members against it.6
Certainly, the actual occurrence of this contradiction depends on 
the distribution of members’ judgments on the premises; however, in 
the complex policy-making of today, distributions where the contradic-
tion does arise will be common. Even though the original paradox was 
identified in cases of jury trial where the premise-conclusion relationship 
was specified by mandatory legal rules, the result can be generalised: ‘a 
paradoxical distribution of views can arise in any group of three or more 
persons faced with a decision that can be broken down into at least two 
constituent sub-decisions’.7 Even if the decision-makers are not formally 
bound to follow any doctrinal rule, the propositions they officially endorse 
are normally expected to be justified by certain reasons and to exhibit a 
measure of integrity.8 Thus, formal logic, commonsense or recognised 
scientific laws may bind them, not unlike the legal doctrine binding the 
courts. This is more interesting than it may appear when applied to regu-
lators or legislators who are typically considered to have more discretion 
than courts. Nonetheless, they often face the integrity challenge.9 
Thus, whenever social choices are explicitly made on the basis of 
reasons, it is likely that various majorities support each of the reasons, 
yet a majority opposes the conclusion they entail. This will also hold if 
the decision-making body is extended beyond the three members to the 
6 This distinctive opinion that a collective may form is the ground on which Pettit and 
Christian List maintain that groups may be agents of their own right. See Philip Pettit, 
‘Groups with Minds of Their Own’ in Frederick F Schmitt (ed), Socializing Metaphysics: The 
Nature of Social Reality (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2003); and also Christian List and 
Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design and Status of Group Agents (OUP 2011).
7 Lewis A Kornhauser and Lawrence G Sager, ‘The Many as One: Integrity and Group 
Choice in Paradoxical Cases’ (2004) 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 249.
8 A system satisfies the principle of integrity if ‘the different propositions it supports are 
consistent with each other’. See Christian List and Philip Pettit, ‘On the Many as One: A 
Reply to Kornhauser and Sager’ (2005) 33 Philosophy & Public Affairs 377, 378. Consist-
ency is judged according to logic, commonsense or some other set of rules external to the 
decision-making system.
9 Note that although for the sake of simplicity in this article I discuss only the social ag-
gregation of beliefs and not of preferences, when the preferences are aggregated the results 
may be similar if the decision-makers are required to justify their choices by giving some 
reasons. 
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whole population, or, more interestingly, to any kind of body which takes 
into account the relevant premise-beliefs of the population.10  
Pettit calls the uneasy choice between the two modes of decision-
making the discursive dilemma and describes it as follows:
going the conclusion-driven way means adopting a course that is 
inconsistent with the premises endorsed by the group and going 
the premise-driven way means adopting a course that a majority 
individually reject. Going the first way means sacrificing collec-
tive rationality for the sake of responsiveness to individuals, go-
ing the second means sacrificing responsiveness to individuals 
for the sake of collective rationality.11   
Throughout his work, Pettit forcefully argues for the collectivisation 
of reason,12 although he acknowledges that in this way responsiveness to 
individual wills (ie to their aggregation into a ‘popular will’) will be lost. 
For him, such frustration of the popular majority is a price worth pay-
ing for the gains in collective rationality. In choosing this way, he finds 
himself in good company – think of the Federalist papers for example – 
but his reason for doing so is his republican understanding of freedom 
as independence from arbitrary power.13 Apparently, a CWM decision is 
arbitrary, for it is not premised on any reasons which are collectively sup-
ported, so PWM should always be preferred.
This is a normative claim which is not uncontroversial, but there 
is also a pragmatic rationale to go that way: the capacity of the group to 
set its goals and to choose the appropriate means to achieve them (ie to 
act as an agent).14 Not all groups need to do that. For example, the group 
of all passengers in a coach may need to decide collectively whether the 
music and the air-conditioning should be turned on or off, and there is 
no reason why their collective decisions even on related issues should 
be consistent. However, some groups with regard to some issues need 
to go beyond this. The inhabitants of a city have good reasons to pur-
sue certain common goals, like the prevention of crime in the city. Such 
purposive communities should adopt consistent decisions as a practical 
10 The panel members may decide not whether P1-P3 are true or false, but whether their 
constituencies or the electorate as a whole believe they are true or false.
11 Pettit (n 2) 274.
12 Note that collective reason should not be equated to what John Rawls and others call 
public reason; collective reason can be specified as the outcome of the premise-wise proce-
dure. Informally, decisions are collectively reasonable when they are consistent with each 
other and are also supported by the reasons for each other.
13 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Clarendon 1997).
14 It is interesting to note that this is prompted also by the etymology of the word. See Jo-
siah Ober, ‘The Original Meaning of “Democracy”: Capacity to Do Things, Not Majority Rule’ 
(2008) 15 Constellations 1.
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matter – otherwise they will undermine their own capacity to achieve the 
purposes. The commitment to certain purposes is a social and not moral 
fact; the commitment may be a matter of deliberately adopted positive 
law or of implicit background understanding. These groups need to act 
as agents and therefore their collective decisions need to exhibit a cer-
tain degree of consistency and rationality. When they face the discursive 
dilemma, such groups must opt for PWM rather than CWM in order to 
collectivise reason.15
The virtues of collective reason and republican theory have already 
gained sufficient attention in the academic literature. However, there is 
one problem which has seemingly been ignored so far, which I call the 
rationality gap and I will turn to it in 1.3 below. Although the problem 
recurs whenever reason is collectivised, it seems that most polities which 
collectivise reason can solve it, and deliberation in the public sphere may 
close the rationality gap. I will make the bold claim that most contempo-
rary polities achieve some measure of integrity in the republican sense, 
and in the second part of the article I will show how the European Union 
(EU) does so. Thus, it is bound to face the rationality gap. Unlike many 
other polities, however, it fails to close it, and in the third part I will sug-
gest why. 
Note that even though I have espoused civic republicanism and the 
theory of deliberative democracy which are highly normative, for the most 
part this article is analytical. In the first part, I expose what I see as a 
problem arising in every democracy and discuss the way I believe democ-
racies do solve it. In the second part, I interpret the existing empirical 
literature on the EU to argue that it collectivises reason. The third part 
also starts from the empirical literature, but it is speculative and goes be-
yond the empirical to make some suggestions which are still to be tested. 
I shall start with a discussion on how actual polities collectivise rea-
son in practice. 
1.2 Collectivised reasoning in the real world
In the abstract PWM model, it seems that all premise judgments are 
taken simultaneously, but this need not be so. Pettit explicitly notes that 
the reason can be (and needs to be) collectivised also diachronically and 
suggests that this can be implemented for example by straw poll or se-
quential voting.16 Neither seems to be implemented verbatim in practice 
15 Pettit (n 6) and also List and Pettit (n 6). 
16 See List and Pettit (n 8). In the sequential priority procedure, the propositions on the 
public agenda are prioritised in a certain way so that the subsequent proposition is voted 
upon only if it is not entailed by those already decided. In straw polls, a vote pro tempore 
is taken on each new proposition and if the result contradicts what is entailed by a previ-
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anywhere, yet any authoritative decision, which takes for granted what 
has been decided previously, is in a sense premised on them.17 This is 
collective reasoning in a broader sense – PWM voting is only the paradig-
matic model, but any polity which has some mechanisms ensuring that it 
systematically displays integrity achieves a degree of collective rationality. 
There is a great variety of institutional devices which bring about 
collective rationality in such a sense. For Pettit, this happens mainly 
through the depoliticisation of certain issues and areas of decision-
making, ie when they are assigned to various ‘contestatory institutions’ 
such as constitutional courts which reduce the ‘hands on power’ of the 
majoritarian organs18 and by indicative representation via consultative 
bodies and arm’s length appointees.19 To these I would add many of the 
traditional constitutional principles, such as the separation of powers, 
judicial review, the duty to give reasons, etc. Certainly, they were not 
meant to collectivise reason, yet they can all be understood as ways to 
bring about the integrity of collective decisions in the republican sense.20 
Thus, in republican polity, citizens have an effective opportunity to chal-
lenge the decisions of their own representatives on the grounds of the 
reasons for which they are adopted; such contestations are to ascertain 
that the governance is according to democratically persuasive reasons 
and that collectively unreasonable decisions are avoided. Conversely, to 
the extent that citizens can challenge the grounds on which authoritative 
decisions are taken, these decisions are non-arbitrary and satisfy the re-
publican imperative. While any contemporary polity collectivises reason 
in this broader sense, exemplary contestatory institutions are nowhere 
more common than in the European Union. Not surprisingly, its raison 
d’être is recognised to be the rationalisation of collective governance. I 
will turn to this in the second part of this paper.
To see how contestation, and in particular the informal participation 
of citizens, may contribute to the rationalisation of collective decisions, 
ous decision, a vote on which of the two should be revised is taken. For a more detailed 
discussion of the sequential priority decision procedure, see Christian List, ‘A Model of Path 
Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions’ (2004) 98 American Political Science 
Review 495. For straw polls as a method to discipline reasoning, see Philip Pettit, ‘Rational-
ity, Reasoning and Group Agency’ (2007) 61 Dialectica 495.
17 Indeed, all institutions and officials work on the assumption that laws are consistent 
with each other and, when this is clearly not the case, the later law is presumed to have 
repealed the former (lex posteriory derogat legi priori).
18 Philip Pettit, ‘Depoliticizing Democracy’ (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 52, 63.
19 See Philip Pettit, ‘Representation, Responsive and Indicative’ (2010) 17 Constellations 
426.
20 These may be contrasted to the electoral institutions, which are ways to make them 
responsive to collective (aggregated) preferences. The opposition is very crude, as elected 
representatives are also under pressure to act according to publicly supported reasons, and 
at least sometimes they do so even against the tide of popular opinion.
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consider again the example of the proposed climate change bill. In an 
actual polity, the decision on P1 and even P2 may be effectively out of the 
control of the panel members. Even if they are formally empowered to de-
cide according to their own judgment, this may be prejudiced or preclud-
ed by the position of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
for example.  Members do not have to be obliged to defer to the IPCC, 
indeed they rarely are, yet it would be sufficient if they cannot publicly 
reject its assertion. Similarly, their position on P3 may be kept in check 
by another authoritative body, like the Office of Management and Budget 
of the US Congress, an authoritative think tank, or, in the case of the EU, 
the example of the other Member States. This may take place over time 
too – once the policy is implemented it will feed back evidence relevant 
for its justification which can reverse some of the opinions.21 Thus, any 
institution or organisation which provides credible information concern-
ing the premises which justify a policy can sway opinions. 
An actual example of the effect of such information on the deci-
sion-making and justification of authority occurred during the recent 
authorisation of a GMO potato for cultivation in the EU. The European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) had issued a non-binding opinion that new 
GMOs can be authorised only if there is no risk that they can confer re-
sistance to antibiotics valuable in human medicine. When evaluating the 
GMO potato, EFSA recognised that there is a small risk that it may confer 
resistance to certain antibiotics, but they were judged not to be important 
for human medicine so it recommended authorisation. In the meantime, 
however, the World Health Organisation (WHO) issued a report, com-
pletely unrelated to the case, that the affected antibiotics are important 
for human medicine. With this information, the NGOs participating in 
the process contested the opinion of EFSA. Although the Commission 
turned a blind eye and deferred to EFSA, as it usually does, this took a 
toll on the credibility of EFSA and provided grounds for several Member 
States to challenge the decision in a case which is currently pending. 
Obviously, neither EFSA nor the Commission is required to defer to the 
WHO or to the NGOs bringing forward this information; this would con-
stitute the degeneration of democratic institutions. The decision-makers 
should not suspend their own judgments on the relevant premises; how-
ever they must take into account the new information and revise either 
their position, or their own earlier judgments to restore consistency. The 
moral of this story is that contestations may make the premises which 
justify certain policy choices pivotal for the choice, which leads to more 
collectively rational decisions as per the model above. It also suggests 
21 Sabel and Zeitlin provide numerous examples in the context of the EU. See Charles F 
Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimen-
talist Governance in the EU’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 271.
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that if decision-making is made more sensitive to new information, the 
‘soft power’ of agents with no formal authority is increased. The success 
of citizens’ participation depends on the information they can provide, 
but also on the available methods for the discipline of reasons which 
make the institutions listen to them. 
1.3 Rationality gap
For all its virtues, collective rationality creates a problem for demo-
cratic polities – too often it frustrates the individual wills of the many. 
Certainly, appeals to reason to constrain popular passion have been jus-
tified by a constellation of thinkers like Rousseau, Condorcet, Burke, 
Madison and even Polybius; indeed, almost all cannons of democracy 
seek to constrain popular will for the sake of the common good, hu-
man rights, principles of justice, etc.22 Yet, even while doing so, none 
of them abandons the notion that authoritative decisions are in some 
ways responsive to the will of citizens. They could do that on the implicit 
assumption that by constraining factionalism or populist passions the 
‘true’ will of the people will reign; in one way or another, the collective will 
has been equated to collective reason. But having recognised that there 
is a dilemma between the two, this is no longer plausible.
Thus far, the dilemma has been discussed in the literature as a 
choice between two alternative decisional procedures, but it bears on the 
very nature of political authority. It is a choice between submitting to 
acts of collective reason opposed by almost everyone and adopting arbi-
trary acts, which, even if supported by overwhelming majorities, are not 
premised on reasons which are themselves supported by such majorities 
(ie for the majority of people they are not reasons at all).23 As we saw in 
the opening section, there are good reasons to prefer reason to will if we 
cannot have both, yet if we abandon the pursuit of responsiveness alto-
gether, we are bound to face a considerable problem which I shall call the 
rationality gap. 
It may be argued that the outcome of collective reasoning is the com-
mon will. But such a redefinition of the concept would be of little help, as 
the actual divergence of the collective decision from the individual wills 
of the members of that collective would lead to their frustration. When 
22 For a subtle account of this contradiction in the American context, see Joseph M Bes-
sette, ‘Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government’ in Robert 
A Goldwin and William A Schambra (eds), How Democratic is the Constitution? (AEI 1980). 
23 This may seem to suggest the impossibility of a republican polity; indeed, Kornhauser 
and Sager conclude that the dilemma shows that collective rationality cannot be guaran-
teed. See Kornhauser and Sager (n 7) 252ff. But in my view, as every polity displays at least 
some integrity, it is a special virtue of civic republicanism that it exposes a problem that is 
not visible from other perspectives.
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frustrated individual wills amount to a majority, we have a yawning gap 
which may threaten the very existence of the collective. Pettit acknowl-
edges that some degree of conformity with popular will is necessary for 
the collective to exist as an agent at all. In their latest book on the sub-
ject, List and Pettit make clear that group agents exist only by virtue of 
the respective intents of their members.24 Certainly, the will to act col-
lectively as a purposive agent in principle is distinct from the disposition 
that the agent should act in a particular way; nevertheless, one may 
wonder whether the frustration of members with regard to the latter will 
not gradually erode their support for the former. Indeed, if on one hand 
the attitudes of the group agent differ from those of the members, and 
on the other if the group agent exists solely by virtue of certain attitudes 
of the members, this would be quite an unstable entity which may ne-
cessitate some deliberate maintenance efforts. In any existing collective 
agent, a varying degree of trust, solidarity and the like can be ascertained 
amongst members and this can explain their tolerance of recurring ra-
tionality gaps. But it is plausible to assume that these are finite, and 
therefore persistent rationality gaps threaten to deplete them while the 
conformity of group decisions to individual preferences may replenish 
them. Therefore, it is incumbent on the republican theory to offer the re-
sponsible decision-makers a way to go along this spiral upwards. Thus, 
nothing in my argument is intended to deny the priority of collective rea-
son claimed by the civic republicans; my aim is only to draw attention 
to the importance of the rationality gap and the impending necessity for 
it to be closed. Any viable republican democracy would need to make a 
constant effort to align collective reason with the majority will. My sug-
gestion is that the grim choice between frustration and populism can be 
avoided only if we do not have to take members’ attitudes to be constant, 
and the theory of deliberative democracy allows for some optimism with 
its promise that individual attitudes might be changed in the process.25
It should be clear that the rationality gap cannot be bridged by the 
mere design of the institutions because the opposing majorities against 
many of the collectively rational decisions will accrue spontaneously out-
side these institutions anyway. In the real world, both PWM and CWM 
decision-making happens all the time. When we opt for integrity and 
gear the constitutions accordingly, the contravening individual attitudes 
24 List and Pettit (n 6).
25 Dryzek and List had already suggested (in different circumstances) that by deliberation 
which precedes the aggregation procedure some of the impossibilities can be avoided, and 
therefore deliberation is a necessary complement to any mechanisms for social choice. See 
John S Dryzek and Christian List, ‘Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A 
Reconciliation’ (2003) 33 British Journal of Political Science 1. Below I will show how ex-
post communication may close the gap, and will claim more generally that the gap is closed 
by a step-wise process of communication in the public sphere.
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towards the conclusion will be formed simultaneously, even if no conclu-
sion-wise decisions are taken anywhere at all. 
The conflict between collective reason and popular will provides us 
with a new perspective of the notorious democratic deficit of the EU. The 
latter is commonly attributed to the depoliticisation of the EU institutions 
or their alienation from the citizens, but if my argument is correct, this 
is not caused by depoliticisation per se, but by the rationalisation that is 
achieved, inter alia, by depoliticisation. Now, this is a sweeping claim and 
in the next section I will discuss why in many actual cases the problem 
may not be so acute. Several factors may mitigate (and ideally close) the 
rationality gap, but when they are inadequate or missing the gap be-
comes visible and threatens the legitimacy of the authorities.
1.4 Closing the gap 
The obvious way to close the rationality gap is by appealing to col-
lective identity or bonds of solidarity.26 It is commonly asserted that some 
sense of solidarity is necessary for the outvoted minority to concede to the 
decision of the majority, and the same may help a frustrated majority to 
concede to the contravening collective reason.27 This sense is a separate 
reason for citizens to endorse the outcome of the PWM decisions of their 
community or their government, even when, following their own beliefs 
on the substance, they would have chosen the opposite.28 More interest-
ingly, the decision reached collectively may persuade the group members 
to change their minds.29 
Consider, for example, a family deciding whether to buy a car. The 
family has three members (eg two parents and one sufficiently mature 
child) and the relevant premises are P1 – whether the car is needed by the 
26 Compare with Pettit, who notes that the ‘identification [of group members] with one 
another will support a wish to reach agreement’ on an ‘antecedently agreed set of consid-
erations on the basis of which to justify particular judgements’. See Philip Pettit, ‘Collective 
Persons and Powers’ (2002) 8 Legal Theory 443, 448.
27 Note that although collective reasoning may create frustrated majorities, this is not al-
ways a graver problem than the one with outvoted minorities. As Renaud Dehousse noted, 
a strict majoritarian rule may feed up centrifugal forces, while collective reasoning avoids 
the divisions between winners and losers. See Renaud Dehousse, ‘Beyond Representative 
Democracy: Constitutionalism in a Polycentric Polity’ in JHH Weiler and Marlene Wind 
(eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (CUP 2003).
28 I prefer to speak about identity rather than solidarity or community, as in the case of the 
rationality gap the controversy is not between majority and minority but between individual 
and collective conclusions. The controversy is relieved when the individual has some sense 
that he or she is part of the same (idem) collective entity, and so the decisions are and ought 
to be identical. 
29 This phenomenon has been well discussed. See, for example, Cass R Sunstein, ‘The Law 
of Group Polarization’ (2002) 10 Journal of Political Philosophy 175. He notes that in cases 
where the group matters for its members, ‘once they hear what others believe, they adjust 
their positions in the direction of the dominant position’ ibid 179.
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family, P2 – whether the purchase is economically wise, and P3 – whether 
the increase of the carbon footprint of the family is tolerable. Let the be-
liefs be distributed according to the following Matrix 2:
Family 
members
P1: Car 
necessary?
P2: Car 
affordable?
P3: Carbon 
footprint 
acceptable?
Individual 
conclusions:
A Yes Yes No No
B Yes No Yes No
C No Yes Yes No
Collective 
beliefs Yes Yes Yes ?
Again there are apparent majorities supporting each relevant prem-
ise. A family which is collectivising reason would decide on each prem-
ise and then, following modus ponens, would have to buy the car even 
though the individual will of each member is against the purchase. How-
ever, unlike the panel members in the earlier example, here each member 
of the family is genuinely committed to treating the car purchase as ‘our 
decision.’ Therefore, he or she may be inclined to revise his or her beliefs 
on the premises. C may just figure out new uses for the car and change 
his or her position on P1. B may still believe it is too expensive, but may 
start to consider it a well-deserved reward. After seeing the happiness the 
purchase might bring to the family, A may also relax his environmental-
ist zeal. 
Similarly, in large groups where citizens identify with their group, 
they will often be prompted by the common opinion shared by their na-
tion to revise their initial individual beliefs about the premises (or at least 
reconsider the relevance and the weight of some premises, as well as the 
evaluation thresholds). In other words, the identity-induced endorsement 
of a certain conclusion will lead them to practise modus tollens and even-
tually align their beliefs with the conclusions.30 I would suggest that the 
proper role of the elected representatives is precisely to facilitate such 
alignment.31 Ideally, while the community practises modus ponens, the 
30 This process should be conceived as the social equivalent to the restoration of coherence 
in the individual mind in the face of the contradictions described by Daniel Kahneman, 
Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011). 
31 As John Parkinson aptly put it in the context of micro-publics, ‘Representatives are 
transmitters of information and instructions in two directions, not just one: ideally they 
convey the views of their principals, and they convey the arguments of the other delegates 
back to those principals for further consideration’. See John Parkinson, Deliberating in the 
Real World: Problems of Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy (OUP 2006) 32. Habermas as-
signs the same responsibility to the members of the European Council and this has been 
observed to be the case with the members of COREPER, see below.
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individuals may practise modus tollens.32 The most telling example of the 
latter is the British people’s overall opposition to the Iraqi war of 2003, 
which within a week changed to overall support, once the decision of their 
government became final (ie the war had started). Apparently, it is the 
members’ own willingness to revise their initial beliefs which is crucial 
for the rationality gap to close, so that PWM and CWM decisions become 
identical. Note, however, that there are two related but distinct prerequi-
sites for such alignment – some identification with the relevant group, so 
that the individuals are willing to reconsider the premises in light of the 
collectively reasonable decision and the communication of that decision 
back to them. While lots of ink has been spilled on the former, the latter 
has gained adequate attention only with the recent interest in the justi-
fication of authoritative decisions vis-à-vis the public.33 In my view, the 
latter is no less important, and in the third part of this article I will argue 
that the problems of the EU lie in the inadequacy of communication, and 
not of identification.  
Conceptually we can distinguish two phases of decision-making: 
first, a collective decision is reached, and then the members who inter-
nalise it revise their initial beliefs. In practice, the phases will not be 
discrete, but the collective position will be formed and the beliefs revised 
in a continuous and incremental process of communication which goes 
both ways. Thus, ideally, all parties would reflectively change their be-
liefs and preferences during the rounds of deliberation34 in response to 
the arguments of the others and possibly new evidence gathered during 
the process.35 When this process is successful, the decisions reached 
would be collectively rational and supported by most of the members. 
This is how, without any mysticism, the Rousseauian general will of the 
nation is formulated, as an instrument to attain what is perceived as 
the national interest. On the suggested account, both collective reason 
and common interest are co-produced through deliberation in the public 
32 Modus ponens is the inference rule where premises dictate the conclusion, while in mo-
dus tollens the conclusion is kept, but some of the premises are revised to restore integrity. 
See Pettit (n 2) 277.
33 Jurgen Neyer, ‘Justice, Not Democracy: Legitimacy in the European Union’ (2010) 48 
Journal of Common Market Studies 903.
34 Cf Benhabib’s democratic iterations. Seyla Benhabib, ‘Reclaiming Universalism: Nego-
tiating Republican Self-Determination and Cosmopolitan Norms’ (The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values, University of California at Berkeley, 15-19 March 2004). 
35 Following List and others, by deliberation I mean public discussion which is substan-
tive, balanced and civil. Christian List and others, ‘Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and 
the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls’ (2013) 75 The 
Journal of Politics 80, 83. This is a ‘moderately thin’ definition, and does not presuppose 
any shared identity, bonds of solidarity or sense of common destiny, as the more popular 
conceptions do. Deliberation in this sense is not meant to bring about any degree of con-
sensus; yet it is expected to result in more considered preferences, ibid.
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sphere.36 Certainly not all national opinions are the result of deliberative 
exchanges, and in many cases much less plausible mechanisms come 
into play. The suggestion I make is that while democratic authorities 
are adopting collectively rational decisions, justified with democratically 
persuasive reasons as they ought to be, they may persuade the citizens 
to internalise their decision. The source of this optimism is not only the 
Habermasian discourse ethics, but also evidence from recent moral psy-
chology which shows that humans have a remarkable capacity to ad-
just their judgments to be consistent with the opinions supported by the 
groups they happen to participate in.37 More pertinently, evidence from 
experiments with deliberative polls supports this suggestion, too.38 Sum-
marising the results from decade-long research, List and others conclude 
that even though deliberation hardly brings about any agreement, it does 
transform the preferences of the participants.39 In the second part below, 
I will discuss examples of collective reason cum belief reversal in EU gov-
ernance. 
In this part, I have discussed the dilemma arising when collective 
decisions premised on reasons have to be taken, how it ought to be re-
solved, and the problem that the preferred solution creates. It has also 
been suggested that reason is collectivised by public contestation, that 
all contemporary polities collectivise reason and achieve at least some de-
gree of integrity, and therefore they must all face this problem. Finally, it 
has been suggested that the problem may be mitigated by deliberation in 
the public sphere. In the light of this account, now I shall turn to the EU 
as a polity which collectivises reason and faces the associated problem, 
which in this case is known as the democratic deficit. 
2. The EU as a collectively rational agent  
In this part I shall discuss the EU in light of the suggested perspec-
tive. Although Pettit himself does not discuss the EU,40 it appears to be 
36 Certainly, this claim is based on Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (MIT Press 1991). Most re-
cently, Habermas has reiterated that ‘only an effective and broad based democratic dispute 
over a common European future could lead to plausible political decisions that would in 
turn make an impression on the financial markets’. See Jürgen Habermas, ‘Bringing the 
Integration of Citizens into Line with the Integration of States’ (2012) 18 European Law 
Journal 485.
37 See most recently Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by 
Politics and Religion (Allen Lane 2012). 
38 List and others (n 35).
39 Note that they also confirm that deliberation does not work by citizens taking cues and 
adopting ready-made preferences held by the elites. Instead, their post-deliberative prefer-
ences are informed by the arguments of the others about their circumstances, beliefs, etc 
(which is not to say that they do not weigh the considerations of the others differently) ibid 89.
40  The only piece in which Pettit discussed the EU is a short conference comment: Philip 
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a good test case for civic republicanism. Clearly, the EU is not a system 
for the expression and aggregation of the will either of its Member States 
or of its citizens. It is not responsive to either, and it is intentionally de-
signed not to be. On the other hand, it seems to be a highly rationalised 
decision-maker, and prima facie exhibits agential capacities – it is able 
to formulate goals and adopt policies which are instrumental to their 
achievement. Now I will briefly discuss some of its idiosyncratic features 
to show how they enable collective reasoning (in the broad sense of integ-
rity). In my view, these features make more sense if they are perceived as 
tools for collectively rational (as opposed to responsive) decision-making. 
This is necessarily sketchy and will rely entirely on well-known conclu-
sions in the existing literature. I admit to have deliberately cherry-picked 
the features which work well on the suggested account, but this is war-
ranted by the scope of the claim I make. I do not claim that the EU is 
collectivising reason all the time – when and to what extent it does is an 
empirical question. What I claim is that the Union, and its deficit, are 
better understood through the conceptual lens of civic republicanism.41
2.1 The EU as a purposive community 
The first question is whether the EU is a group which is appropriate 
to personify in the specified sense. On all accounts, it seems that it is. 
Whatever the citizens’ stance on integration, even the most severe scep-
tics seem to expect the Union to act rationally in pursuance of certain 
purposes and to speak in a single voice; they expect it to act as an agent. 
Pettit, ‘Comment on Walker: Europe’s Constitutional Momentum’ (2005) 3 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 239 which does not address this issue. Yet he has proposed 
civic republicanism as a general paradigm for international administration. See Philip Pet-
tit, ‘Legitimate International Institutions: A Neo-republican Perspective’ in John Tasioulas 
and Samantha Besson (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (OUP 2010). Richard Bel-
lamy systematically applies the republican perspective to the EU with compelling argu-
ments. See eg Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, ‘Democracy, Sovereignty and the 
Constitution of the European Union: The Republican Alternative to Liberalism’ in Zenon 
Bankowski and Andrew Scott (eds), The European Union and its Order: The Legal Theory of 
European Integration (vol 61, Blackwell 2000). However Bellamy’s approach is quite differ-
ent from the one I have adopted following Pettit, most notably he is critical of depoliticisa-
tion which is characteristic both of Pettit’s republicanism and EU constitutionalism. See 
Richard Bellamy, ‘Democracy Without Democracy? Can the EU’s Democratic “Outputs” 
Be Separated from the Democratic “Inputs” Provided by Competitive Parties and Majority 
Rule?’ (2010) 17 Journal of European Public Policy 2.   
41 Bellamy and his collaborators have already shown that liberal democracy is an inad-
equate account for the EU, and that civic republicanism (or democratic liberalism in their 
parlance) is the most appropriate one for a multilevel polity. See Bellamy and Castiglione 
(n 40) and Richard Bellamy and Claudia Attucci, ‘Normative Theory and the EU: Between 
Contract and Community’ in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (eds), European Integration 
Theory (2nd edn, OUP 2009). My argument is somewhat different – that the rationalisation 
of the EU makes the republican account the most appropriate, and this would be valid even 
if it was not a multilevel one. The two arguments are complementary but not dependent on 
each other.
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Still, some scholars deny that the Union has any common purpose42 and 
claim that it is merely a system for the facilitation of international coop-
eration, enabling the Member States to achieve their goals. However, this 
understanding is increasingly losing support in positive law. Although 
the more ambitious precepts of the Constitution were abandoned, the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) still ascribes to it as a single body cer-
tain purposes43 and notably obliges its members to help achieve them.44 
Apparently, it is treated as an entity capable of having its own goals dis-
tinct from those of the members. Further, the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU (TFEU) stipulates that ‘[t]he  Union  shall  ensure  consistency 
between  its  policies  and  activities,  taking  all  of  its  objectives  into 
account’.45 This is perhaps the clearest requirement for a system to col-
lectivise reason that one can find in a legal instrument. There is no need 
to elaborate further on the numerous cases where secondary law ascribes 
distinct purposes to the Union to assert that it is appropriate to conceive 
it as a system for collective agency whose institutions are required to ex-
hibit integrity in their reasoning.46
Certainly the EU institutions do not follow the PWM model proce-
dure, but it can be shown that it collectivises reason in the broader sense 
of displaying integrity. In the remainder of this part, I show that the 
various EU institutions can be interpreted as the means to achieve in-
tegrity and to collectivise reason at the pan-European level. Note that 
by employing the principle of integrity, the republican account not only 
legitimises the EU, but also provides a standard for its evaluation. It is 
commonly asserted that the Union should not be evaluated by the same 
42 For example, Eleftheriadis vehemently objected to the claims of Joshka Fischer and 
Jurgen Habermas ascribing common purpose to the Union; however, he would probably 
not object to ascribing a purpose in the practical terms used here. See Pavlos Eleftheriadis, 
‘Cosmopolitan Law’ (2003) 9 European Law Journal 241; and more recently Pavlos Elefthe-
riadis, ‘The Moral Distinctiveness of the European Union’ (2011) 9 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 695. 
43 Art 3 TEU stipulates that the aim of the EU is to promote peace, its values (listed in art 
2) and ‘the well-being of its peoples’. It elaborates further that the EU has to establish an 
area of freedom, security and justice; an internal market, etc. See OJ C 83/17.
44 Art 4 (3) TEU stipulates that ‘The  Member  States  shall  facilitate  the  achievement  of 
the  Union’s  tasks  and  refrain  from  any  measure which  could  jeopardise  the  attain-
ment  of  the  Union’s  objectives’ ibid.
45 Art 7 TFEU, OJ C 83/53.
46 Once again, this notion of purposive community should be understood pragmatically; I 
hasten to distinguish myself from the grand narratives of a common European destiny, eg 
Joschka Fischer, ‘From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European 
Integration’ (Speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 12 May 2000). For a pertinent 
criticism of such narratives, see Justine Lacroix, ‘Does Europe Need Common Values? 
Habermas vs Habermas’ (2009) 8 European Journal of Political Theory 141. It seems to me 
that Lacroix’s notions of constitutional discipline and shared critical reflections are not un-
like the public contestations espoused by republicanism.  
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standards as nation-states because it is a polity of its own kind,47 but this 
allows it to be its own standard, which is normatively implausible.48 The 
suggested account avoids this problem because while absolving the EU 
from the need to be responsive, it subjects it to the principle of integrity 
which can be quite demanding if taken seriously. 
2.2 Rationalising the Union  
It is well known that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
was created on the Madisonian rationale to prevent the excesses of the 
wills of European peoples in certain areas which had resulted in suicidal 
trade protectionism and two world wars.49 Economic liberals today would 
claim that the Union is the embodiment of economic rationality which is 
necessary to constrain the populist immoderation of the welfare state,50 
and many social democrats would almost agree with that, by decrying the 
crude market rationality of the EU which constrains the wilful policies of 
national democracies.51 A stark recent illustration of its function to dis-
cipline unreasonable national governments came in the autumn of 2011 
when two national governments were effectively fired by their European 
peers for failing to act according to the imperatives of fiscal reasonable-
ness.
While the latter examples may be exceptional and while they cer-
tainly created considerable controversy, this situation was quite common 
during the process of accession of the new Eastern democracies. Termed 
‘conditionality’ in that context, it was celebrated as a tool of EU foreign 
policy to transform the candidate countries into rationalised Union Mem-
bers.52 The special monitoring to which Bulgaria and Romania were sub-
47 Most prominently, Giandomenico Majone, ‘Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”: The Question 
of Standards’ (1998) 4 European Law Journal 5. Interestingly, the author asserts that this 
is so because of the unique goals the EU has to pursue.
48 Francis Cheneval and Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Case for Demoicracy in the EU’ (Pa-
per prepared for the EUSA Conference, Boston, March 2011). 
49 A brief look in any textbook on the EU will inevitably show a paragraph about the post-
war distrust of national governments. See, for example, Paul P Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, 
EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (4th edn, OUP 2008) 2: ‘discrete economic sectors [to] be 
managed efficiently and technocratically by supranational institutions away from the fray 
of politics’. It is ironic that the Community was created because of the distrust of national 
governments. The Union delivered on its promise while helping the national governments to 
deliver on theirs and thus regain trust. Now, the EU is increasingly distrusted because it is 
a constraint of the re-credited national governments. 
50 For example, Majone observed that by Community regulation ‘industries want to avoid 
inconsistent and progressively more stringent regulations’ in the Member States. See Gi-
andomenico Majone, ‘The EC: An “Independent Fourth Branch of Government”?’ (1993) EUI 
Working Paper SPS 93/9, 19.
51 See, for example, the discussion in Fritz Scharpf, ‘Economic Integration, Democracy and 
the Welfare State’ (1997) 4 Journal of European Public Policy 18. 
52 With regard to the countries from the Western Balkans, the (failing) building of nation-
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jected (in the area of justice and home affairs!) even after their accession 
is another case in point.53 Also, the EU is commonly used as a contestato-
ry mechanism vis-à-vis the policies of the Member States by their citizens 
as well. In particular, national civic actors, frustrated in the national po-
litical process, contest domestic legislation either directly by complaints 
to the European Commission, or indirectly by asking national courts to 
apply the acquis in the face of contravening national law. The latter ex-
amples are not of the rationalisation of European decision-making, but of 
the national one by the European institutions, yet they are still cases in 
point, where certain discipline is imposed on popular will to maintain the 
integrity of the European purposive community.54 The forthcoming fiscal 
and banking union would extend this type of European disciplining of 
national will to the old and great Member States as well. 
The rationalisation was and still is achieved by mechanisms for de-
politicisation and contestation. Although the framers by no means lacked 
bold visions for ‘ever closer union’, what they seemed to care most about 
was to design a depoliticised bureaucracy able to deliver decisions as ra-
tional means to the stipulated Community ends. The ECSC established 
a surprisingly powerful supranational institution – the High Authority 
– to govern the two strategic industries of the Member States on the 
basis of the common premises enshrined in an international treaty.55 
This method has continued until today, and the EU is crammed with all 
the types of contestatory institutions that Pettit enlists – constitutional 
courts, consultative bodies and arms-length appointments. His call to re-
duce the hands-on power of elected politicians neatly corresponds to Ma-
jone’s assertion that the European governments delegated powers to the 
states was explicitly contrasted to the building of Member States. See Giulianno Amatto and 
others, ‘The Balkans in Europe’s Future’ (Report of the International Commission on the 
Balkans, Centre for Liberal Strategies 2005). 
53 On the occasion of democratic reason yielding to populism in Hungary, Romania and 
Bulgaria, Jan-Werner Mueller recently wrote for the press: ‘One of the explicit goals of Eu-
ropean enlargement to the east was to consolidate liberal democracies …. Governments in 
turn sought to lock themselves into Europe so as to prevent backsliding; it was like Ulysses 
binding himself to the mast in order to resist the siren songs of illiberal and anti-democratic 
demagogues in the future’. See Jan-Werner Mueller, ‘Europe’s Democracy Dilemma: How 
and When to Step In?’ The Guardian (London, 19 July 2012). This EU-enforced rationalisa-
tion is considered by many to be a blessing in the concerned Member States, for it compen-
sates for the inadequate rationalisation of domestic policy by the populist governments.
54 See Menon and Weatherill who also make the argument that the EU is to overcome the 
democratic failures of the Member States. Anand Menon and Stephen Weatherill, ‘Trans-
national Legitimacy in a Globalising World: How the European Union Rescues its States’ 
(2008) 31 West European Politics 397.
55 The Schuman Declaration famously proposed that ‘Franco-German production of coal 
and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority …. The setting up of this 
powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound ultimately to 
provide all the member countries with the basic elements of industrial production on the 
same terms, will lay a true foundation for their economic unification’.
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EU in order to insulate certain policies from majoritarian government 
and to ‘produce a supranational regulatory regime which not only com-
plements, but is … more credible than the national systems’.56  Today, 
the view that the EU as a whole is only a system for rational constraint 
of the will of the Member States is difficult to sustain in the face of its 
growing competences to make political choices.57 Notwithstanding this, 
the constitutional structure of the Union remains essentially one of a 
contestatory system for collectivising reason.58 While the particularities 
of the EU are still easily explainable in classical functionalist terms, I be-
lieve republicanism takes us further, because functionalist explanations 
best suit the ‘regulatory’ and ‘technical issues’, and are not well suited to 
apparent political choices, a limitation which in my view republicanism 
does not have.59
The most pertinent example of a mechanism geared towards the 
integrity of collective decision is the ‘Community Method’ by which most 
of the legislation is adopted – upon the proposal of the Commission by 
the European Parliament and the Council acting together. The Com-
mission’s primary function is to make expert policy proposals further-
ing the otherwise unrepresented community interest, so much so that it 
has been likened to an independent think-tank.60 In practice, the Com-
mission may promote a certain parochial interest, but only inasmuch 
as it is rationalised, ie presented as the best way to attain a common 
pan-European good. When such a proposal is made, it is subjected to 
contestations from all sides – Member States (in the Council), factions 
(in the European Parliament), and regional and sectoral interests (in 
the Committee of the Regions and in the Economic and Social Com-
56 Giandomenico Majone, ‘Independence Versus Accountability? Non-Majoritarian Institu-
tions and Democratic Government in Europe’ [1995] The European Yearbook of Compara-
tive Government and Public Administration 117, 125.
57 Majone himself recently argued that political decisions should be taken by political pro-
cess, although he maintains his distinction between political and regulatory issues. See 
Giandomenico Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of 
Integration by Stealth (OUP 2009). 
58 There have been numerous calls from various quarters for politicisation of the EU. See 
Bellamy (n 40) and also Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, ‘Why There is a Democratic Defi-
cit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’ (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 533. Note that politicisation is not always inimical to rationalisation. Follesdal and 
Hix claim that ‘electoral contests provide incentives for the elites to develop rival policy 
ideas’ (ibid) which may be a route to avoid what Pettit calls false negatives. 
59 Reason can be and ought to be collectivised on distributive decisions as well. Although 
my example in the beginning of the paper was on ‘regulatory’ issues, it can be applied to 
distributive ones – one can think of the Greek bailout where the premises are ‘default im-
minent’, ‘help deserved’, ‘austerity measures working’, etc. Indeed, any decision which must 
be justified with several separate reasons creates a dilemma and the associated rationality 
gap. 
60 John Temple Lang, ‘The Commission: The Key to the Constitutional Treaty for Europe’ 
(2003) 26 Fordham International Law Journal 102. 
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mittee respectively). More importantly, Member States in the Council 
tend to accept it (because of the rationality-driven momentum behind 
the proposal) or must provide rational argumentation in order to pub-
licly reject it. This contestatory mechanism is protected by a prohibition 
for the Member States to initiate their own proposals (in most areas), 
thus barring their parochial interests from the agenda. On the republi-
can account suggested here, the Commission, as the only repository of 
knowledge of the pan-European good, is responsible for avoiding false 
negatives, ie ‘failures to perceive options that public valuations would 
support’.61 The Member States in the Council are responsible to avoid 
false positives, ie from one side to prevent the Commission from promot-
ing sectional interests as common ones, and from the other to prevent 
the disproportional burdening of their own interests. This is actually a 
mirror image of Pettit’s model: he suggests that the elected institutions 
should be constrained by expert bodies,62 while with the Community 
method the expert proposals are constrained by political actors. Either 
way, the effect should be similar. The Community method may well go a 
bit further in the avoidance of false positives through the restriction of 
the legislative incentive of the political actors. It is worth emphasising 
that the Commission has no power to force acceptance of its proposal 
other than the persuasiveness of the reasons given in support. Its draft 
must be so rationalised that it would be impossible for (almost) any of 
the political representatives to reject it publicly. For better or worse, the 
Community method is the most striking example of collectivised reason 
displacing (even if not overcoming!) the popular will.63 
In cases where the authority of the EU institutions to regulate by 
hard law is limited, ‘soft’ alternatives have become increasingly com-
mon and their claim for legitimacy is commonly supported by claims for 
effectiveness and credibility.64 Under the umbrella term New Modes of 
Governance (NMG), a great variety of practices and structures has devel-
oped, such as policy coordination, peer review, monitoring and compara-
tive analysis, operating in a heterarchical network involving public and 
private bodies, as well as independent scientific authorities. Character-
istically, decision-making in that mode is partly or completely outside 
61 Pettit (n 18) 60.
62 ibid.
63 Note also that for Majone the Commission is a fiduciary representative of pan-Europe-
an interest, which again corresponds to Pettit’s concept of indicative representation, even 
though they have different reasons to arrive at these views. See Majone (n 57) and Pettit (n 
19).
64 See Richard Bellamy and others ‘Evaluating Trustworthiness, Representation and Po-
litical Accountability in New Modes of Governance’ in A Heritier and M Rhodes (eds), New 
Modes of Governance in Europe: Governing in the Shadow of Hierarchy (Palgrave Macmillan 
2011) 2. 
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the control of the traditional forms of authority, and generally presup-
poses cooperative rather than legally binding relationships.65
Again, the NMGs are not at ease in the liberal paradigm, but they 
sit well on the suggested account with its focus on reasons and justifi-
cation. Indeed, the participation of unelected experts or stakeholders, a 
‘selectorate’ as it were, is problematic on the classical accounts where 
counting votes is what matters. But they should be welcome if their con-
tribution to decision-making is seen in terms of rationalisation – they 
ask for the reasons for choices, contest them on substantive grounds, 
and offer alternatives. As they have no formal powers, for their claims 
to have any chance of success they must substantiate them with ar-
guments and evidence which the power players cannot easily ignore in 
public. I have already mentioned the critical role of organised civic soci-
ety in public contestations. Thus, on the one hand, the methods of new 
governance, such as direct participation, expert reports, comparative ex-
amples, etc, rationalise the traditional hierarchical decision-making. On 
the other, the NMGs are widely used in the EU to actively make policies, 
coordinate, and set goals; the participants share information, exchange 
arguments and counterarguments and generally justify their claims with 
reasons which can pass muster in the public discourse.66 As alternatives 
or complements, in both the Community Method and the NMG, the role 
of reasons is central for the decision-making, therefore driving it towards 
collectivising reason, premise-wise. 
Certainly, not all decisions are taken through either of these alterna-
tive avenues, and in several important domains the political will (formed 
at national level) dominates. The Union is only partly rationalised, and 
this is precisely in the areas where there are robust commitments to 
common purposes. So where these commitments are thin or absent, the 
Union is merely aggregating the wills of the Member States. For example, 
in the domain of foreign policy, even after the Lisbon Treaty, no common 
purpose has been stated, except in very general terms, and that is why 
it is not appropriate for the EU to seek to behave as an agent at all.  The 
common criticisms for its failing to act coherently in this area are equally 
inappropriate. Instead of rationalisation via the Community method, the 
65 It is debatable whether the new modes of governance are a radical alternative to the ‘old’ 
one, as Sabel and Zeitlin believe, or whether they are the two ends of a continuum, as Tania 
Borzel maintains. For a discussion of the contested interpretations of the various modes, 
see Kenneth A Armstrong, ‘The Character of EU Law and Governance: From “Community 
Method” to New Modes of Governance’ (2011) 64 Current Legal Problems 179.
66 In a seminal paper, Scott and Trubek emphasised the centrality of deliberation, which 
serves ‘both to improve problem-solving capabilities and possibly provide some degree of 
democratic legitimation’. See Joanne Scott and David M Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New 
Approaches to Governance in the European Union’ (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1, 6.
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Union acts on an ad hoc basis only when there is political will among the 
Member States aggregated in a conclusion-wise mode.67
Beyond their role as participants in governance, old and new, citizens 
have another way to become involved in decision-making which similarly 
drives the Union towards collectivised reasoning. They are empowered 
to contest European legislation in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
which has made the latter quite unlike the other international courts.68 
Again this is rationalisation, here in the form of judicialisation, which 
makes the premises, not the conclusions, pivotal for the final decision. 
Thus, the four freedoms were constitutionalised by the ECJ in the 60s, 
without anyone noticing that constitutionalisation happens to be the first 
mechanism that Pettit mentions in his model of republican polity.69 
Another contestatory mechanism (which so far has failed to deliver 
on its promise) can be seen in the coveted involvement of national par-
liaments in the public valuation of Union legislation. Within the Mem-
ber States, the national parliaments occupy the focal point of collective 
reason.70 At the EU, the European Parliament (EP) is supposed to be 
such an institution, but while the pan-European public sphere is barely 
emergent71 it cannot be the focus and catalyst of opinion formation. The 
gradual increase in its formal powers is no immediate remedy for this 
situation because there is no connection ‘between the growing demo-
cratic politics inside the European Parliament and EU Council and the 
views of the public’.72 Note, however, that this does not prevent the EP 
from providing an important avenue for the public actors to contest leg-
islative proposals.73 Even if the debates within have little repercussion 
on the general public outside, in recent years interested observers have 
witnessed many vibrant contestations, and occasionally the citizens or 
stakeholders have prevailed in the arguments, securing the amendment 
or defeat of Commission proposals.74 
67 This is oversimplified, and even the decisions in foreign and defence policy are influenced 
by certain considerations and reason giving, especially in the field of human rights. Still, the 
point is that in some areas the rationalisation has gone much farther than in others. 
68 Even as the access of citizens to the ECJ is still severely limited by the Plaumann doc-
trine (Case C 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 199). 
69 Pettit (n 18).
70 See Habermas (n 36). Note that even though in contemporary democracy parliaments 
are rarely policy makers, they remain the central legislative arenas. See Nelson Polsby, 
‘Legislatures’ [1975] in Philip Norton (ed), Legislatures (OUP 1990).
71 Thomas Risse, ‘An Emerging European Public Sphere? Theoretical Clarifications and 
Empirical Indicators’ (Paper presented to the conference on the ‘Europeanisation of Public 
Spheres, Political Mobilisation, Public Communication and the European Union’, Science 
Center Berlin, 20-22 June 2003).
72 Follesdal and Hix (n 58) 553.
73 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to this point.
74 A recent example being the defeat of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in 
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On the other hand, the national parliaments are deliberately dis-
empowered vis-à-vis the EU so they have been redundant as an avenue 
for the contestation of EU policies. The Lisbon Treaty introduced the so-
called ‘yellow card’ through which national parliaments are expected to 
contest draft European legislation, in parallel, and probably before the 
position of their government is expressed or even formed. While there 
may be doubts about the actual efficacy of the mechanism, this certainly 
is yet another contestatory institution for further rationalisation of the 
EU. In the third part, I shall revisit this; for now, it suffices to say that 
the involvement of parliaments promises to break the singularity of the 
national voices of Member States in EU matters and this drives the col-
lectivisation of reasoning up from national to European level. 
The process known as comitology is perhaps the European cham-
pion of deliberative democrats. It allows the Commission to adopt acts of 
delegated legislation which are subject to review by special committees 
consisting of national experts, microcosms of the Councils as they were. 
Although the procedures vary (and were just reformed pursuant to the 
Lisbon Treaty), the core principle is that if committee members disap-
prove of the proposal, it is referred to the Council. In the overwhelming 
majority of cases it is not, and is in effect approved. Christian Joerges 
and Jürgen Neyer were perhaps the first to note that the comitology com-
mittees represent a novel ‘forum for deliberative politics’ where the par-
ticipants are genuinely engaged in the search for the common good.75 In 
a case study of the regulation of foodstuffs they found that:
In comitology, however, preferences cannot be simply asserted, 
but need to be justified by arguments on health risks which are 
backed by scientific evidence – a feature which seems astonish-
ing to international relations theorists, but which was confirmed 
by all delegates ... and which is also supported by our own obser-
vations of committee sessions. Thus, relative power would need 
to be defined with regard to the ability to present and substanti-
ate convincing arguments.76
From our perspective, the comitology committees are fora for contes-
tations – in principle the national experts can challenge the Commission 
proposal, but only if they can justify their claim that it does not pertain 
the summer of 2012 as a result of intensive public criticism throughout Europe. This was 
also a rare case of the successful formation of a pan-European public opinion.
75 Christian Joerges and Jurgen Neyer, ‘From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Delibera-
tive Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology’ (1997) 3 European Law 
Journal 273.
76 Christian Joerges and Jurgen Neyer, ‘Transforming Strategic Interaction into Delibera-
tive Problem-solving: European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector’ (1997) 4 Journal of 
European Public Policy 609.
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to the agreed common purposes. The successful adoption of the proposal 
supposes that it does, and so comitology appears to be another mecha-
nism to collectivise reason. Further to this, we may assume that the ex-
pertise of the committee members changes the focus of the deliberations. 
Unlike the political leaders in the Council or EP, here the members are 
competent to discuss the scientific foundation of the policy proposals 
rather than their overall end. So we can expect that the debate in such 
committees would focus on the factual premises rather than the policy 
conclusions, increasing the weight of the former in decision-making at 
the expense of the latter.77 Once again, the decision-making is centred on 
the premises to drive the system away from CWM and towards the col-
lectivisation of reason. 
The picture is similar if we turn to the internal mode of operation 
of the Council itself or its working groups.78 A growing body of construc-
tivist scholarship finds abundant empirical evidence that members and 
staffers in all these bodies act in a non-confrontational, cooperative, 
‘pro-norm’,79 consensual and ‘deliberative mode’.80 They claim that the 
decision-making is driven to a considerable extent by arguments rather 
than by bargaining.81 In the words of Jeffrey Lewis, in the Council ‘the 
negotiators subject claims to group scrutiny for collective legitimation or 
77 Certainly, this is only a hypothesis. It would be very interesting to test empirically to 
what extent comitology committees decide on a premise-wise basis, but unfortunately comi-
tology is notoriously non-transparent and there is little evidence either way. Note that the 
lack of transparency raises legitimacy issues, but it has no bearing on the claim that comi-
tology shifts the focus from conclusions to premises and collectivises reason in that sense. 
78 For a recent overview, see Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Council of Ministers and European Council’ in 
Erik Jones and others (eds), Oxford Handbook of the European Union (OUP 2012). See also 
Jeffrey Lewis, ‘How Institutional Environments Facilitate Cooperative Negotiation Styles in 
EU Decision Making’ (2010) 17 Journal of European Public Policy 650, and the other arti-
cles in the same issue.
79 When acting in pro-norm mode, the agents may still promote strategic interests, yet 
they comply with the established conventions for cooperative behaviour and perceive it as 
their duty to reach an agreement or at least not to appear obstructionist. In such cases, the 
agents are commonly instructed to ‘oppose as long as not isolated’. See the contribution of 
Jonathan Aus in Daniel Naurin and Helen Wallace (eds), Unveiling the Council of the Euro-
pean Union: Games Governments Play in Brussels (Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 116.
80 Some authors tend to equate deliberation with any non-confrontational mode of deci-
sion-making, which is misleading. There is very little public deliberation in the Council or 
the various committees, and without an existing pan-European public sphere, the EU is 
short of the ideal of deliberative democracy. To avoid confusion and in line with the defi-
nition above (n 35), I am using the term only for deliberation in the public sphere which 
affects the opinions of the citizens, and shall refer to the rest as cooperation. Notwithstand-
ing this, such practice may still lead to collectively reasonable decisions and this is often 
achieved presently in the EU.
81 ‘Arguing’ employs assertions for the factual premises of the contested decision, while in 
‘bargaining’ the process focuses on the preferred conclusions. In bargaining, the outcome 
is usually determined by factors unrelated to the issue itself, while the premises which are 
relevant are disregarded. 
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rejection’.82 Again this is not to say that the Council decides in PWM — it 
does not. But the focus on reasons brings about more integrity and col-
lective reason in the broader sense.   
Although the witnessed ‘deliberative’ practices are distinct from the 
procedure defined above as collective reasoning, they are related to it in 
at least two ways which are relevant for this paper. The first way is by 
the central role of the argumentation and reasons in the decision-mak-
ing of these bodies which seems undisputed. All of the studies support 
the conclusion that reasons matter, and when they matter systems tend 
to display integrity even if they do not adopt the decisions by explicit 
premise-wise voting. The second way is by the constraints on the choices 
placed on the decision-makers – they have to appear cooperative and 
mindful of what is understood as collective purpose. Thus, their deci-
sion must respect the whole body of previous decisions (including non-
binding ones such as action plans and impact assessments) and can 
be contested for being incongruent with them. Again, although such a 
norm-governed mode is not identical to PWM, it can bring about the in-
tegrity of decision-making indirectly (as the contestatory mechanisms do 
according to Pettit).83 There are also other features of decision-making in 
the Council and the like, akin to deliberation, most importantly the evi-
denced frequency of consensus and persuasion, but they are not relevant 
for the argument of this paper. 
2.3 Closing the gap in COREPER 
COREPER is another institution where the abundant evidence for 
the argumentative and consensual mode of decision-making in the em-
pirical literature warrants the conclusion that it is geared to collectivise 
reason. But it is interesting in another way too. This is the COmmittee 
of the diplomatic REPresentatives of the Member States to the EU, who 
in theory are agents of their governments. Apparently, when they reach 
consensus after deliberations (which they often do) some of them must 
82 Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Strategic Bargaining, Norms and Deliberation’ in Naurin and Wallace (n 
79) 173. He notes that the corollary of this is that agents are open to persuasion by good 
arguments, but the actual change of heart of the opponent is not necessary for my argu-
ment, as long as even the unpersuaded agents find it difficult to maintain unsubstantiated 
positions. 
83 It can be demonstrated by an abstract model that when the proposals are screened ex 
ante for conformity with a certain inference rule or principle, the discursive dilemma is 
avoided and the adopted decisions are collectively rational. See Gabriella Pigozzi, ‘Belief 
Merging and the Discursive Dilemma: An Argument-based Account to Paradoxes of Judg-
ment Aggregation’ (2006) 152 Synthese 258. In republican terms, this would mean that the 
Council is a contestatory institution where proposals are subjected to criticism and those 
which are exposed as not conforming to the guiding principles of EU integration are pre-
sumably defeated. For a similar abstract model, see also Jesus Zamora Bonilla, ‘Optimal 
Judgment Aggregation’ (2007) 74 Philosophy of Science 813.
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have strayed away from the initial instructions received from their prin-
cipals. Certainly, sometimes they receive new instructions en route but 
this is not always the case. Jeffrey Lewis observes that that members 
of COREPER ‘have earned some notoriety for being able to find consen-
sus on anything given enough time to “cut slack” and sell results back 
home’84 and also ‘[an] observable pattern of deliberation, used regularly 
by COREPER to find solutions, is the collective plotting to overcome do-
mestic reserves (“cut slack”) or force a national capital to rethink instruc-
tions’.85 Thus, COREPER appears to be not only reaching a cooperative 
(and presumably collectively rational) solution, but also to engage in ex 
post advocacy for it. An interviewed member revealed that it is one of their 
‘standard practices’86 to ask the committee to help them persuade their 
principals and constituencies at home.87 These observations are very sig-
nificant for the argument of this paper because they suggest that modus 
tollens is regularly practised in the EU, when the outcome of collective 
reasoning is internalised by the members of the deliberative bodies just 
like the family in the car purchase decision model discussed in the first 
part of this paper. Here, the motives for a change of heart may be less no-
ble than identification with the collective, yet constructivist scholarship 
has observed that social norms, webs of informal relationships, comity 
and organisational culture have similar effects.88 There are many reasons 
which may lead the agents to internalise a certain decision and then 
update their initial premises to align the outcomes of individual and col-
lective reasoning. From this brief glance at the community institutions, 
it appears that what Joerges and Neyer observed in comitology may be 
generally applicable to all EU bodies: “the institutionalisation of interac-
tion [is] a process of internalising new preferences and even identities. 
Institutionalisation … is a cognitive process that involves a redefinition 
of the self and the other”.89 Sceptics may find the redefinition of the self 
is too demanding, but it may suffice if the participants reconsider only 
their preferences, and there is considerable evidence that they often do.90 
Joerges and Neyer further note that ‘delegates, perceiving them-
selves as part of a transnational problem-solving community, may be 
84 Lewis (n 82) 170.
85 ibid 174.
86 ibid 174, emphasis added.
87 Similar is the case in many other committees. For another example, see A Niemann, 
‘Deliberation and Bargaining in the Article 113 Committee and the 1996/97 IGC Represen-
tatives Group’ in Naurin and Wallace (n 79). 
88 Once again, the reader is reminded that for the argument developed in this paper it is 
irrelevant whether committee members were actually persuaded or had other reasons to 
embrace the collective decision.
89 Joerges and Neyer (n 75) 291.
90 See the literature referenced in footnotes 37, 38 and 39.
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able to change their governments’ perceptions of interests or even simply 
bypass them’.91 Apparently, there is a huge difference between chang-
ing and bypassing formed national positions. Although integrity may be 
achieved in both cases, the latter is much less democratically acceptable; 
furthermore, it will open a rationality gap. However, if members subse-
quently persuade their principal, the system would be practising modus 
tollens: representatives would collectivise reason in the deliberative body, 
and undertake the responsibility to change the beliefs of their govern-
ments (and ideally their fellow citizens) on the premises. Thus, the con-
clusions reached by individual governments will be aligned with the col-
lective conclusion reached in the respective councils of the Union. On the 
suggested republican understanding, collective reasoning should go in 
two directions, and therefore the ‘agents’ are not only allowed, but ought, 
to be transmitters in both directions – in democratic iterations which may 
close the rationality gap.92 In the same vein, Habermas recently insisted 
that ‘the heads of government would have to reach an agreement … and 
campaign for this in their national public arenas’.93 So, while traditionally 
the heads of governments are conceived as agents of their sovereign peo-
ple, in a surprising twist Habermas allows the relationship to be reversed 
so that leaders reach agreements at the European level and persuade 
their national public opinions later.
Once again, none of this is to say that all or even most of the deci-
sions adopted by the EU are collectively rational. While various political 
scientists give evidence of a considerable degree of deliberation on rea-
sons and argument-based contestations in all institutions, the question 
whether arguing or bargaining prevails is bound to remain open.94 Yet the 
studies discussed in this part can bear the conclusion that the EU is a 
system geared to collectivise reasoning by means of depoliticisation and 
91 Joerges and Neyer (n 76) 619.
92 Compare again with Parkinson: ‘the “better arguments” that persuade representatives 
within a micro-deliberative forum will also convince people outside it once they have been 
exposed to those arguments in their own, separate deliberations’. See Parkinson (n 31) 32. 
For an abstract example of how such a feedback loop would work, recall the car purchase 
example discussed at the beginning of the paper. In the context of the EU, the decision may 
be to fund the construction of a chemical plant. Once the representatives have reached 
agreement to support the project, the representative of state A may persuade his govern-
ment that the plant is sufficiently safe (probably using expert arguments provided by his 
partners), the representative of state B may persuade her government that it is going to be 
less costly than expected, and the one of state C – that the plant is well worth the effort.
93 Habermas, ‘Bringing the Integration of Citizens into Line with the Integration of States’ 
(n 36) 486.
94 Summarising a decade-long research programme carried out by a constellation of po-
litical scientists, Deitelhoff and Muller claim that the answer is inconclusive and is bound 
to remain so. See Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Müller, ‘Theoretical Paradise – Empirically 
Lost? Arguing with Habermas’ (2005) 31 Review of International Studies 167; and also An-
dreas Warntjen, ‘Between Bargaining and Deliberation: Decision-making in the Council of 
the European Union’ (2010) 17 Journal of European Public Policy 665.
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contestation, and thus at least some of the decisions are taken as if in 
premise-wise mode. On the other side of this coin, the Union appears as a 
test case for civic republicanism; its idiosyncrasies may be illustrative of 
the problems that are neglected by the republican theory,95 in particular 
the one I called the rationality gap. If every decision which abides by the 
integrity requirement potentially opens a rationality gap, the EU, as the 
most rationalised empirical polity, is bound to experience it most acutely. 
Not surprisingly, it is the EU and not any nation state which is notorious 
for its ‘democratic deficit’. On the suggested account, the deficit must be 
understood as the difference between where the previously established 
premises would lead and where the majority of the Member States (or 
citizens) would prefer to be.96 In other words, this is the gap between 
what counts as ‘our’ decision as a Union and ‘our’ preference as a group 
of individual members. The sense of alienation and frustration citizens 
experience is just a symptom of this persistent and systematic difference. 
This claim, however, does not conceive the EU simply as an alienat-
ed, elitist or bureaucratic organisation which defies the will of its citizens. 
As was discussed in the first part, the discursive dilemma may arise for 
any collective body which decides on the basis of some reasons and this 
is regardless of whether the agents A, B and C in Matrix 1 are representa-
tives, bureaucrats or segments of the population. Depending on the actual 
distribution of their beliefs, any rationalised polity may experience ration-
ality gaps, even if the actual officials who take the decisions adequately 
represent the views of the citizens without the impossibilities, distortions 
or frictions identified by the social choice scholarship. The pervasiveness 
of the problem illustrated by the abstract model suggests that the ques-
tion is not why the EU experiences democratic deficit, but rather why the 
nation-states do not, and I will turn to this in the next part.97    
95 Pettit and List discuss what they call impossibility results, which are more general than 
the rationality gap. See List and Pettit (n 3). They suggest how the conditions which lead 
to such impossibilities can be plausibly relaxed to make the normatively attractive social 
choice procedure possible. Yet these papers are very abstract and rarely discuss what the 
suggested functions would look like in the real world.  
96 If we take the Member States to stand for the position of their citizens, we can interpret 
the gap as the difference between the Union decision and the will of its citizens. But it is 
uncertain whether this is plausible – as the Member States themselves collectivise reason, 
their position is not identical to their public opinion. On the other hand, in nation-states 
the two are often aligned by deliberation in the public sphere, as will be discussed below. 
97 Certainly this is not to say that the EU does not suffer from numerous institutional 
pathologies, where the Commission or even obscure advisory agencies may force upon the 
Member States and citizens decisions which are neither collectively rational nor supported 
by sufficient majorities. The rationale given for such regimes is the ‘objectivity’ of expert 
bureaucracy, but this is itself a contested issue. For a forceful argument against it, see 
Marjolein BA van Asselt and Ellen Vos, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Uncertainty 
Paradox’ (2006) 9 Journal of Risk Research 313. Compare also Elizabeth Fisher, Risk Regu-
lation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart 2007).
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Thus, if I am correct to link the rationality gap with democratic defi-
cit, it follows that the latter is not a matter of institutional design. It 
is unavoidable for any group which is collectively rational, ie which is 
able to collectively commit to certain ends and then systematically take 
the actions which are rational means to achieve them. All constitutional 
reforms will face the identified impossibility. Rendering the institutions 
more responsive will make the so far silent popular will explicit and its 
clash with the collective reason will become even more visible, while still 
failing to provide a way to resolve the conflict.
The claim that the Union should not be made more responsive to the 
will of its citizens is counterintuitive and appears to be in tension with my 
earlier claim that reason is collectivised by public contestations (which 
commonly include some form of citizen participation). This is because, 
on the republican account, participation is welcome with regard to the 
premises but, as the discursive dilemma teaches, may be in tension with 
the conclusions reached. The normative reasons to centre the decision-
making on the premises were discussed in the first part; but this shift 
is also necessary to make citizen participation meaningful. In a democ-
racy, the simple statement of an unrepresentative stakeholder on their 
preferred conclusion makes little sense without the assertion of certain 
facts which justify the claim in general terms. Indeed, the participants 
in any decision-making process would rarely omit supporting their claim 
‘we want policy P to be adopted’ with a more or less elaborate statement 
‘because P1, P2 and P3 obtain’. Thus, citizens involve themselves in the 
decision-making with a certain desired conclusion in mind, but, to get it 
adopted, they make arguments and counterarguments on the premises. 
As a matter of practice, they contest the judgments of the relevant au-
thority on the established premises – using new arguments or providing 
new information – or point to the relevance of new premises.98 If a pol-
ity is to collectivise reason, the unfortunate lesson from the discursive 
dilemma is that the input citizens provide should be on the premises, 
and so the input per se does not contribute to closing the gap. What may 
contribute is the communication of the justification back to the citizens. 
In this part I have ‘portrayed’ the EU as a republican polity. This is 
to say that I have demonstrated that the EU can be conceived in republi-
can terms and that its peculiar institutional system makes more sense if 
conceived as a way to avoid arbitrary decisions and collectivise reason in 
98 Thus, the exclusion of a premise which is highly relevant for a certain group from consid-
eration in decision-making renders the decision unjustifiable for that group. For example, 
the current GMO regime makes human health and safety relevant premises but excludes 
all concerns for the cost of co-existence with non-GMO crops. As the latter is of paramount 
concern for organic farmers, any decision which does not take it into account is unjustifi-
able and arbitrary for them. 
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that sense. I do not claim, however, that the EU is a republican polity, ie 
that it satisfies the republican ideals, which is an empirical question and 
beyond the scope of this paper.
On this understanding, the Union is bound to face a rationality gap, 
as all polities which collectivise reason do. Recall from the first part that 
this gap is a structural problem which arises whenever polities collectiv-
ise reason. However, even if the problem is ubiquitous and persistent, I 
have suggested that it may not be an insurmountable one, as sometimes 
the agents internalise the collective decision and revise their initial be-
liefs so that the gap is closed. The findings of constructivist scholarship 
have a very interesting bearing on this intuition. The evidence for persua-
sion and cooperation in the EU corroborate the one from the deliberative 
polls (mentioned in the conclusion of part one) that deliberation changes 
preferences so it can close the rationality gap. Indeed, in Brussels the 
agents (ministers and bureaucrats) at least sometimes convince each 
other, change their beliefs and preferences, cooperate, agree, or conform 
to norms and public expectations. Yet, one may wonder why it is the 
Union, and not the other polities, which seems to exhibit the most severe 
democratic deficit? For the deliberation to succeed in closing the gap, 
there were two enabling conditions that emerged in the first part. The 
first was the willingness of the citizens to internalise the collective deci-
sions, and the second was the availability of channels for the reasons 
for these decisions to reach back to them. While the lack of the former is 
much discussed and lamented, the importance of robust pan-European 
justificatory discourse has received less attention. Without discounting 
the importance of the former, in the next part I will seek an answer in 
the latter. 
3. Competition for the closure of deliberating communities 
In the first part of this article, I showed how the successive use of 
modus ponens and modus tollens can align the results from a premise-
wise and conclusion-wise decisional procedure in a group of three. For 
large groups, the alignment would take more rounds of such inferences 
which take place through the communication of justificatory arguments 
and counter arguments in what is known as the public sphere. This is not 
to say that communication alone would change initial beliefs, but only 
that it is an enabling condition for this to happen. In this paper I will set 
aside the question of when people are willing to engage in serious delib-
eration and eventually reverse their beliefs, to focus on the environment 
which makes this possible in the first place. 
So far, I have contrasted collective reason to the ‘popular will’ with-
out specifying the latter. I have taken it to mean the aggregation of in-
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dividual conclusions for the desirability of the proposed policies. This 
seems appropriate for many cases; for issues which are not salient and 
do not receive much media attention, citizens may form their opinions 
independently of each other. In such cases, the popular will is merely a 
function of their individual attitudes. However, people also discuss sali-
ent issues informally – with their friends, families, at parties, charity 
events or in sports clubs. Thus, they form what appears as individual 
opinions in deliberation with others and these opinions are at least part-
ly shared within the respective discussion groups. In every democracy, 
while bills make their way through the respective legislative institution, 
they are informally discussed in the public sphere, and it is trivial to note 
that post-deliberation attitudes are different. Even if entrenched inter-
ests and pre-deliberative opinions strongly prejudice the resulting public 
opinion, the latter will at least be partly modified during the process of 
decision-making. Thus, popular will, properly understood, is an aggrega-
tion of post-deliberation attitudes, and in any event it is formed during the 
process.99 In this view, public or national interests are not exogenous, but 
are socially constructed in the process of public reasoning.100   
More interestingly, the opinion of every individual will be affected 
differently by the different peoples he deliberates with, and as people can 
potentially deliberate in several overlapping groups, they are likely to be 
driven in conflicting directions. Group overlaps create tensions: a citizen 
may belong to and deliberate in two groups simultaneously, but when 
the different groups reach different decisions he cannot internalise both. 
Thus, even if a citizen identifies himself both with his nation and with 
Europe, he cannot come to believe that p is true (so that he can support 
the collectively rational national policy X premised on p) and that p is not 
true (so that he can support the collectively rational European policy Y 
premised on ¬p). For example, it might be collectively rational for the EU 
to impose a tax on financial transactions and collectively rational for the 
UK to attract international banks to the City of London. Both of these pol-
icies are dependent, inter alia, on the premise ‘banks can move away eas-
ily’. A Briton cannot believe that this premise is true so that the national 
policy is justified, and that it is not true so that the European policy is 
justified. While in principle he may be equally open to persuasion by his 
99 This informal deliberation is not related (not directly!) with the collective reasoning dis-
cussed in the previous section. If the group is collectivising reason, its decisions may be 
different from either of the two opinions.
100 For this view, see Trenz, drawing on John Dewey: Hans-Jörg Trenz, ‘In Search of the 
Popular Subject: Identity Formation, Constitution-making and the Democratic Consolida-
tion of the EU’ (2009) 18 European Review 93. Actually, Trenz goes even farther than me 
to claim that discursive practices create identities and popular subjects. He considers the 
relationship between nested European and national identity discourses, but does not per-
ceive them as being in competition, as I do.
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fellow countrymen and by his fellow Europeans, one of the groups will 
eventually prevail. As we cannot expect people’s opinions to be malleable 
infinitely, we can expect that after a certain number of democratic itera-
tions the opinions will stabilise and the persons involved will become less 
susceptible to further persuasion. Thus, the same person may end up 
with different post-deliberation attitudes depending on the order of these 
discussions (as well as on other contingencies), while the simultaneous 
processes of opinion formation in overlapping communities interfere with 
each other. 
Consider one problem emerging in integration scholarship. As was 
discussed above, many researchers provide abundant evidence of coop-
eration and rational persuasion in the Council and the like. In many 
cases, however, for instance in GMO regulations, there are none of these, 
even though the conditions seem appropriate. One common culprit is the 
‘politicisation’ of the issue101 and that ‘[domestic] public opinion severely 
limited the ability of member states representatives to engage in the … 
deliberative search for better policy’.102 There is an air of uneasiness in 
finding the ‘deliberation’ between public officials to be at odds with delib-
eration in national public spheres, but there are numerous other studies 
which also identify ‘politicisation’ as a negative condition for reaching 
cooperative solutions.103
Pollack and Schaffer do not define ‘politicisation’ but emphasise that 
in their case-study there was a strong public opinion in some domestic 
constituencies, which constrained the agents and prevented them from 
reaching a collectively reasonable solution. To accommodate this and 
similar findings, I will take the ‘politicisation’ of an issue to mean that 
public opinion is formed and consolidated on a certain position so that 
deliberation is unlikely to change it any further. The issue is ‘politicised’ 
not only when it is decided at a political, as opposed to a technocratic, 
level, as there is significant evidence for cooperation at both levels, and 
examples of failures at both, too. It can be expected that if the domestic 
discussion has not yet ossified, the level or salience is not an obstacle 
to deliberation. Only when a certain single public opinion on the issue 
101 In their study, Pollock and Shaffer conclude that ‘the deliberation … has fallen victim 
to the widespread politicization of the GM issue’. See Mark A Pollack and Gregory Shaffer, 
‘Risk Regulation, GMOs and the Limits of Deliberation’ in Naurin and Wallace (n 79) 149.
102 ibid 161. 
103 To avoid confusion, it is important to note that the term politicisation in integration 
scholarship has a different meaning from the one civic republicans have in mind. When 
Pettit speaks about politicisation and depoliticisation, he means the empowering of un-
elected institutions which are not representative in the traditional sense. It is in this sense 
that I have used the term until now, too. EU scholars use the same term for a salient issue, 
or one which is decided at a high level. The two senses of the term should be distinguished 
by the context, but to minimise confusion I put the word ‘politicisation’ in quotation marks 
when using it in the latter sense.     
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is formed and this opinion is internalised as a common position of our 
group by an overwhelming number of its members would further delib-
eration be derailed. This position may be just an aggregation of individual 
preferences (pre- or post-deliberative) of group members, or it may result 
from a more subtle practice of collective reasoning, via deliberative in-
stitutions. However formed, the crucial difference in my view is whether 
this position is already internalised, ie whether a significant number of 
members have revised their initial positions accordingly.104 
Public deliberation is the most democratically plausible cause of in-
ternalisation105 and the process has been observed empirically in vari-
ous circumstances.106 On the basis of the available empirical literature, 
Cass Sunstein concludes that the ‘effect of deliberation is … to decrease 
variance among group members, as individual differences diminish’.107 
Note that the group itself will often exist before and independently of the 
formation of the common will, but in some cases it may be constituted 
during the process itself – such is the case of many civic organisations 
emerging around a single cause. Whatever the method, when a position 
is formed its understanding as ‘common’ provides a separate incentive 
for members to internalise it. Thus, it consolidates and is closed for any 
further challenges, deliberative or other. As Sunstein observed, ‘social 
ties among deliberating group members tend to suppress dissent’108 and 
that is how a group may speak with a single voice for what is perceived 
to be the interest and will of all. Such a group may act as a singular 
agent with interests of its own, and naturally its actions are governed by 
instrumental rationality which uncompromisingly chooses the one best 
alternative. As the agency emerges out of the commitment to a certain 
purpose, it is unavoidably parochial; it cannot promote anything but this 
purpose. Normally, such a purposive agent would fail even to consider 
arguments relevant for any other interest but the promotion of its own 
purpose, and that is why for this agent the issue is effectively closed.109 
104 Note that the internalisation of the common will closes the rationality gap, as argued 
before. But the focus of this section is the common will, and its consolidation pertains both 
to groups which do and which do not collectivise reason.
105 Other means to consolidate the common will may be tradition, sense of identity, religion, 
charisma, ideology, manipulation.
106 Fishkin’s studies are the best known. See James S Fishkin, When the People Speak: 
Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (OUP 2011). 
107 Sunstein (n 29) 178: He also noted that this leads to the group moving to a more extreme 
position, which is precisely what Pollack and Shaffer observed.
108 ibid 181.
109 Recall that according to List and Pettit, for a group to act as a single agent it must speak 
with a single voice and display integrity, so closure and agency appear to co-originate and 
constitute each other. See List and Pettit (n 6).  This allows us to treat collectives as single 
agents; otherwise, it would make no sense to speak about collectives and states in the sin-
gular at all. 
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There is no further deliberation internally, and members of the relevant 
group join efforts to act in pursuance of the common position and, if nec-
essary, to guard it against external argumentative challenges. If a com-
mon position is formed but not internalised in such a sense, it would be 
unstable – external agents may appeal to the different inner groupings 
and change what will eventually appear as collective opinion. This is no 
longer possible when a singular group opinion is formed; such a group is 
an agent with a mind of its own. 
I suppose that this is what routinely happens in nation-states when 
they define something as ‘national interest’. Such interests are commonly 
perceived as something objective, but it is an open question whether, for 
example, it is in the national interest to protect a certain industry, thus 
favouring its owners and employees and disfavouring its consumers. Yet 
at a certain point of time a common opinion either way may form, win-
ning the hearts and minds of most citizens. In principle, this may hap-
pen in many different loci – at the regional level, in minority or functional 
groups, etc. It can also happen at the supranational or indeed at any 
level. Although it is rare to witness consolidated public opinion at the Eu-
ropean level, there was at least one example of such in the opposition to 
the Iraq war which famously prompted Habermas to announce the birth 
of the European public sphere and the European demos.110
Here is not the place to take stock of all the consequences of this 
closing,111 but the problem with the consolidation of popular opinions in 
multilevel decision-making systems, where the same citizens participate 
in several nested groups, should be apparent. As the collective opinions 
ontologically depend on the attitudes of the respective individual mem-
bers, discourses at each level are effectively in competition with each 
other to form a consolidated collective of supporters. In the EU, the con-
solidated collective will formed at the national level precludes further de-
liberation at the European level, and vice versa.112 
110 See Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, ‘February 15, or What Binds Europeans 
Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe’ (2003) 10 
Constellations 291. A decade later and with all the acrimony the Euro crisis brought, it is 
clear that the announcement was quite premature, but this does not undermine the claim 
that it is at least possible on a case-by-case basis.
111 For example, such apparent group consensuses often protect hidden exploitation. See 
Chantal Mouffe, ‘Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism’, Institut für Höhere Stu-
dien (IHS) Working Paper 72, Wien 2000 <www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_72.pdf> ac-
cessed 19 November 2014. 
112 Note that despite the alleged commonality of values, etc, the opinions reached at each 
level are bound to be at odds with each other because the inclusion of different deliberators 
at the upper level leads to the introduction of different information and different considera-
tions.
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In principle, scholarship on deliberative democracy maintains that 
the involvement of the general public (as opposed to interested stakehold-
ers) prevents precisely this type of parochialism and closing. The general 
public is treated as a valuable source of knowledge of human needs and 
vulnerabilities.113 The problem is that national publics are not general 
with regard to pan-European interests; at that level, they become stake-
holders without a pure public to correct for their pathologies.114 On the 
contrary, the pathologies may even be exacerbated when sectoral inter-
ests can exploit a history of capture of the national opinion to perpetuate 
their parochial interests, casting any contestations as offensive to the 
‘national interest’.
While I am not aware of any empirical research of ‘polarisation’ of 
opinions in simultaneous deliberation at various levels, it is a very plau-
sible hypothesis that at each level public opinions form in competition 
between each other for the hearts and minds of the citizens. Given the 
limited time and attention of the latter, such competition is inevitable 
even in ideal conditions. If personal opinions were to change incessantly, 
the competition may continue ad infinitum, or perhaps the most gen-
eral discourse would pre-empt all the others. In the non-ideal case, the 
malleability of individual opinions is finite and at some point individual 
opinions stabilise so a single common will emerges and the discourse 
proceeds no further. Closing allows the nations to speak in a single voice, 
which is a condition for their capacity to achieve goals, but it makes any 
further argumentative challenges inimical to ‘national interests’. The clo-
sure creates a distinction between the perceived interests of the members 
of the nation from what may be the rival interests of others.115 The out-
come of opinion formation varies according to the location of the bounda-
ries of the deliberative space; within the boundaries, individual opinions 
tend to homogenise and polarise.116
Now, in the EU the interests of all European citizens should be taken 
into account, yet public spaces remain largely national and exclusion-
113 Compare, however, with Bellamy and others (n 64), who make the point that the partici-
pation of stakeholders ‘threatens to become partial and arbitrary in its representativeness 
of civil society’ (147) and recommend nesting the participatory mechanisms in general (and 
representative) publics. See also the discussion in the previous section that collectively 
reasonable decisions need to account for the considerations of everyone affected.
114 For the pathologies of partisan groups, see Cass R Sunstein and Reid Hastie, ‘Four Fail-
ures of Deliberating Groups’ (2008) University of Chicago Law & Economics Working Paper 
No. 401; Sunstein (n 29).
115 Compare the suggested notion of closing against deliberative challenges with Hannah 
Arendt’s claim that democratic politics became possible in Ancient Athens only when the 
city walls were erected around the agora, thus creating a political space shielded from exter-
nal challenges. See Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics (Schocken Books 2007). 
116 Note that deliberation leads not merely to internal convergence, but to ‘convergence on a 
relatively more extreme point among predeliberation judgments’. See Sunstein  (n 29) 178.
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ary.117 We may assume counterfactually that communication in a pan-
European public sphere emerging around the Union institutions would 
decrease variances in the individual wills of all the citizens (as it does 
in national spheres) and ideally produce European opinion, tending in-
terests which are European. However, the existing internal borders cre-
ate deliberating subgroups tending respective parochial interests. These 
subgroups not only find their opinions thwarted by EU decisions but they 
also impede the communicative process at the upper level which appears 
as an external challenge to them.118 
The dialectic of homogenisation and radicalisation of deliberative 
groups puts the overlapping groups in competition with each other to 
form ‘their’ will and close themselves in protection thereof. Their success 
is likely to depend on the actual communicative practices, and in turn 
on the quality of the public sphere within each group. As George Vasi-
lev notes ‘in-group environments already have the discursive infrastruc-
ture in place through which mindsets can be altered [while] across-group 
communicative conduits are liable to be weak’.119 Most successful would 
be the groups which have created communicative conditions which en-
able them to form a position which is both prompt and appealing for all 
or most of the members. The construction of more robust and more in-
clusive public spheres is what determines the success of a group to reach 
a consolidated opinion, ie to formulate and protect an interest which is 
the group’s own. Only in this way can they sustain their capacity to act 
in pursuance of their previously adopted goals without being constantly 
undermined by yawning rationality gaps. Note that closing the rationality 
gaps appears to be not only a matter of legitimacy but also of sustain-
ability of the group. On the other hand, when public deliberation within 
the group fails to close it in this way, there is a window of opportunity for 
opinion formation at a different (higher) level. 
Although will formation at national level is usually much faster, 
there are many cases where the issue is too technical, too uncontrover-
117 Notwithstanding that there is a nascent EU public space. See Risse (n 71). He and sev-
eral collaborators in a series of studies during the first decade of the century found that the 
‘same European themes are discussed at the same time at similar level of attention across 
national public spheres’. However, the overall attention paid to these issues remains low. 
118 European integration opens up decision-making institutions to external normative and 
argumentative interventions and may prevent the adoption of single-minded parochial de-
cisions. However, this is not matched by a sufficiently robust opening of national public 
spheres. The yellow card mechanism mentioned in part two promises to contribute to the 
latter, but its efficacy is still to be seen.   
119 See George Vasilev, ‘Preaching to the Choir or Converting the Uninitiated? The Integra-
tive Potential of In-group Deliberations’ [2012] Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy 1, 7. Vasilev continues to say that inside groups one can find ‘the 
psychological and communicative infrastructure’ which is sufficiently developed to allow 
‘transformative deliberation’ ibid 19.
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sial or not sufficiently salient for national will to be formed. This is the 
case of ‘uncertainty’ which was identified by constructivist scholarship 
as another condition enabling deliberation.120 However, on the suggested 
account it is not the mere uncertainty but the availability of multiple 
voices in cases of uncertainty which makes a difference.121 The consti-
tutional system of the Union generally opens national public spaces to 
external argumentative pressure,122 but the deliberative homogenisation 
of national opinions closes the borders again. 
Another factor, often identified as an obstacle to cooperation, is pub-
licity which should also be unappealing for the deliberative democrats. 
On the suggested account, publicity in the Council and in the related 
bodies will prevent cooperation only when consolidated will has already 
been formed at national level. Consolidated positions will prevail because 
they constrain the agents to defend them, even if they are argumentative-
ly defeated. In contrast, when positions have not yet become a common 
article of faith, the arguments of the others may support the position of 
internal dissenters and the delegate may side with them to reverse the 
initial determination of the national interest. 
If my argument is correct, then two major processes should be dis-
tinguished in the relations between the EU and the Member States. First, 
there is a process of collectivised reasoning (in the broad sense) at the 
Union level. Apparently, it leads to rationality gaps in all cases where 
contrary opinions are formed in national public spaces. Rationality gaps 
also open on many less salient issues on which no consolidated national 
will is formed, yet where a substantial number of citizens reasoning on 
their own have reached opposite conclusions. On many issues (perceived 
as technical or simply unnoticed), neither national nor individual wills 
are formed; there, EU policies will face indifference or mild support and 
no gap will open. The second process is one of public deliberation in 
the nascent pan-European public sphere123 which results in precious few 
examples of European public opinion tending pan-European rather than 
national interests. In principle, the latter process of opinion formation 
could provide the feedback loop and close the gap opened by the former 
process. However, pan-European opinion emerges well after the national 
120 See the contributions in Naurin and Wallace (n 79), for example.
121 Note that uncertainty is not an exogenous factor but itself is a matter of perception: in 
the GMO controversy discussed by Pollock and Shaffer, the opponents of the technology 
believed that the effects of genetic engineering are uncertain, and the proponents that the 
effects are certain. This suggests that uncertainty is not (or is not only) a scientific matter. 
122 As Risse and Kleine note ‘speakers could never be sure whether their audiences held 
national preferences, party preferences, European versus national ones, or simply personal 
preferences’. See Thomas Risse and Mareike Kleine, ‘Deliberation in Negotiations’ (2010) 17 
Journal of European Public Policy 708, 16.
123 See Risse(n 71) and also Risse and Kleine (n 122).
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opinions on the same issue have emerged from the more robust national 
public spheres. For the time being, the EU public sphere is bound to lose 
the competition for will-formation with the national public spheres, and 
therefore pan-European opinions are shared by very few individuals. The 
national discourses on one hand have already closed the rationality gaps 
between popular opinion and collective reason at national level, and on 
the other hand these formed national opinions frustrate the formation 
of pan-European opinion, thus preventing the closure of the rationality 
gap at the European level. Because of this competition, the latter gap 
is bound to persist as long as the conditions for public deliberation are 
better in national public spaces. Moreover, this is self-sustaining, as the 
quality of the public sphere at national level fosters communication there 
to the detriment of the development of the public sphere at the European 
level. 
Thus, in my view, the democratic deficit of the EU is not a matter of 
weak representation as it is commonly perceived, but rather a matter of 
unidirectional representation. More participation would strengthen only 
the input side of the representative relationship, while the emerging ra-
tionality gaps can be closed by the justificatory discourse which goes in 
the opposite direction. In national public spheres, such gaps are closed 
by the standard accountability practices – governments and all public 
authorities explain and justify their decision, and some of the citizens 
are persuaded to revise their initial beliefs. Thus, governments who act 
in accordance with collective rationality and against the tide of popular 
sentiments get re-elected more often than not. In a recent study, Christo-
pher Lord found that the quality of justificatory discourse within the EP 
is comparable to that in the Member States.124 However, at the European 
level, such justifications fail to achieve what they routinely do in the na-
tional context simply because citizens have already formed their opinions 
in the parochial national discourses.  
In principle, public deliberation at each of the levels may be gov-
erned to avoid the untoward results of the competition which the EU is 
bound to lose. Jane Mansbridge has drawn attention to arrangements 
where group leaders negotiate not only externally but also internally 
within their groups.125 Ideally, leaders may use their place at the border 
of the deliberative groups and mediate between internal and external dis-
courses until they are aligned and the gaps at all levels are closed. This 
might be the case with COREPER discussed above, where the representa-
124 Christopher Lord, ‘No Representation Without Justification? Appraising Standards of 
Justification in European Parliament Debates’ (2013) 20 Journal of European Public Policy 
243.
125 Jane Mansbridge, ‘A Deliberative Theory of Interest Representation’ in MP Petracca (ed), 
The Politics of Interests: Interest Groups Transformed (Westview Press 1992).
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tives cooperate to reach a reasonable solution externally, and take up the 
responsibility to reverse the national position by internal negotiations 
with their principals. More generally, Vasilev claims that limited com-
munication across groups followed by extensive in-group discussion to 
reflect what has been said by the others may allow a solution even of the 
most fundamental conflicts.126 His empirical examples of such an inter-
nal-external dynamic of deliberation are very similar to what was shown 
to happen in COREPER. Interestingly, in Vasilev’s cases, the issues are 
both salient and divisive so they provide a good counterpoint to a possible 
objection that COREPER appears to be so successful because it leaves all 
the controversial agenda items to the Council.
In the same vein, the new mechanism for cooperation of national 
parliaments discussed above is intended as a way to manage the com-
petition for opinion formation. The greatest promise of the ‘yellow card’ 
is that it would bring the debate on a European issue within the national 
public space at an early stage, possibly before the position of the govern-
ment is formed and the national opinion consolidates. There are many 
voices in a single parliament, and the contestation of a draft acquis at an 
early stage at the national level may prevent the formation of a single con-
clusion and single ‘national’ will. Thus, the mechanism can be expected 
to open the national decision-making process to deliberative challenges 
in cases where its conclusions are presently reached without much dis-
cussion in obscure agencies of the national executives. Most importantly, 
in order to raise a yellow card, the parliaments must cooperate and act 
together, which means that they would have to speak more of a European 
interest if they wish to recruit followers beyond the border. 
Apparently, the contribution of such institutions for managing the 
competition to favour pan-European opinions is limited. The political 
leaders should play their part, too, and recently Habermas called them 
to take responsibility to mediate between the European and national 
public sphere and negotiate with their citizens support of the decisions 
which are necessary to save the Euro rather than to follow the received 
mandates.127 It remains to be seen under what circumstances leaders 
take such responsibilities, given their obvious interest not to go against 
the tide of in-group polarisation. As Bellamy and Castiglione note, such 
‘arrangements can also give elites incentives to maximise rather than 
reduce their differences and to solidify group differences rather than al-
lowing them to evolve or reduce’.128 
126 Vasilev (n 119). 
127 Habermas, ‘Bringing the Integration of Citizens into Line with the Integration of States’ 
(n 36).
128 Bellamy (n 40) 13, reference omitted.
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To conclude, in this part I have claimed that in a multilevel polity 
rationality gaps occur at each level, and each level of collective reason-
ing has to deal with its own frustrations. Contravening popular will is 
formed (by public deliberation or otherwise) where intended or where not 
intended. Wherever it is formed, it tends to consolidate and close against 
further deliberative challenges. While justificatory discourses may close 
rationality gaps in nation-states, in multilevel systems opinions may con-
solidate at a level different from the one that is actually empowered, and 
then deficits persist. In the EU, this seems to be the case.
4. Conclusion
One of the purposes of this article has been to expose a problem 
neglected in republican theory which I called the rationality gap. It may 
appear trivial to claim that collective reason deviates from popular will, 
but this goes against both the popular perception of democracy as gov-
ernment responsive to citizens’ will and against the democratic theory 
which explicitly or implicitly equates democratic responsiveness with 
public reason and the common good. More importantly, the notion of 
the rationality gap prompts different understandings of the deficiencies 
of modern democracy – not as imperfections of the links between repre-
sentative institutions and citizens which need to be strengthened, but as 
a fundamental contradiction which needs additional efforts to be resolved 
in the public sphere. Thus, the problem with the gap does not undermine 
civic republicanism, it only makes deliberative democracy a necessary 
complement to it.
The other goal has been to suggest that republican theory provides a 
better understanding of the EU. This is not to propose yet another label 
claiming to capture the nature of the beast – the actual institutions can 
be interpreted in many different ways. I ‘portrayed’ it as a collectively ra-
tional agent to throw some new light on a much discussed problem: from 
such a perspective the democratic deficit appears to be an instance of 
the rationality gap, and there is no pan-European democratic discourse 
to close it. As such gaps arise from the logical inequality between collec-
tive and individual rationality (both of which have good normative and 
practical claims to prevail), they are experienced by all polities. Thus, the 
democratic deficit of the EU is a logical necessity rather than an insti-
tutional contingency129 and the host of institutional reforms which have 
been proposed to solve it are bound to fail even if they succeed in linking 
its institutions to the citizens more tightly. More citizen participation is 
certainly to be welcomed, but if it is true that rationality gaps may ap-
129 Even though much of the literature on judgement aggregation is in terms of different 
decision-making procedures.
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pear in any group which collectivises reason, the increased input will not 
solve this problem because majorities which oppose what is collectively 
rational remain possible. The only way to resolve such tensions is to 
persuade such majorities to accept what is collectively rational.  Unlike 
the other polities which presumably experience the gaps but close them 
by democratic iterations, the European Union cannot do this because its 
public remains fragmented.
Thus, rationality gaps are closed when the beliefs of the citizens 
change during the decision-making process. While citizens may or may 
not internalise collective decisions (and their reasons to do so vary), this 
happens in a step-wise process of communication in the public sphere. 
In this way, common opinions are formed and they become entrenched as 
‘national interest’. My suggestion is that nation-states, albeit rationalised 
decision-makers themselves, do not experience acute rationality gaps 
because they are closed by deliberation in their robust public spheres. 
When this process is successful, citizens identify the collective position 
as their own and revise their own initial beliefs accordingly. When a cer-
tain level of coherence is reached, the communicative process is closed 
to further discursive challenges. This could potentially happen at the 
European level by communication in the nascent pan-European public 
sphere; however, this discourse is usually pre-empted by the competi-
tive discourses in the public spheres of the Member States. As the com-
munication there is more robust, citizens form their opinion there first 
and close themselves for further discourses from without. As deliberat-
ing groups tend to polarise, the formation of internal common opinion 
derails the simultaneous communicative process at EU level. Again, the 
notion that European public opinion forms in competition with national 
opinions may appear trivial, but most advocates of multilevel democracy 
assume they are independent or complementary and certainly not rivals. 
It is also commonly assumed that communication and participation may 
democratise all levels of a multilevel polity. If the argument developed in 
the last part was correct, we cannot systematically have decisions which 
are both collectively rational and supported by the majority of citizens at 
each level, even in the best of circumstances. 
The single most important conclusion we have to make is that the 
mismatch of collective reason and popular will is not simply an institu-
tional problem. In the case of the EU, its democratic deficit is commonly 
perceived as a problem with representation, but in my view the problem 
is not on the input side. It is a failure of the feedback loop, and the solu-
tions should be sought in the directions of better communication and 
justification. This is not to say that better representation and more par-
ticipation are not necessary, since of course they are. Yet, as long as EU 
decision-making is not embedded in a robust public sphere which can 
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generate pan-European public opinion in support of certain policies, the 
deficit will remain.
Although the paper is intended to offer better understanding rather 
than solutions to the problem with the European democratic deficit, two 
possible ways out emerge. The first is to integrate national public spaces 
by connecting them into a network so that the justificatory discourses 
on policy issues spill from one national public sphere to another. Even if 
citizens deliberate mainly locally, discourses may be connected so that 
the issues and arguments transcend the national boundaries and ideally 
produce genuine pan-European opinions.130 Apparently, institutional de-
sign can only be of limited help – institutions may create incentives for 
citizens to communicate across borders and foster the robustness of the 
pan-European public sphere in the long run. But there is hardly a way 
for any democratic institution to force opinion changes on citizens or to 
forestall the consolidation of their opinions in the ‘wrong’ place; so the 
tensions are bound to remain. The second is to take up the challenge 
and compete: whenever EU institutions identify a problem and reach a 
decision before a contrary opinion is formed at another level, they have a 
chance to justify it to the citizens so that they revise their beliefs and the 
rationality gap closes at the European level. Arguably, this may be the 
case on a number of issues which are not salient in any of the Member 
States; but we are still to see such an issue becoming salient at the Euro-
pean level. Although the first option may seem utopian, neither of the two 
is radical and in any case neither requires major constitutional changes.
130 For such expectations, see Richard Bellamy and Sandra Kröger, ‘Domesticating the 
Democratic Deficit? The Role of National Parliaments and Parties in the EU’s System of 
Governance’ [2012] Parliamentary Affairs 1–21. 
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